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Abstract
Liberatore and Schaerf (Proceedings of the ECAI’ 98, 1998) give a proof that model checking
for propositional normal default theories is in P2 and 
P
2 [O(log n)]-hard. However, the precise
complexity is left as an open problem. We solve this problem by proving that model checking
for normal default theories is complete for P2 [O(log n)]. This is the class of decision problems
solvable in polynomial time with a logarithmic number of calls to an oracle in NP. Additionally,
we analyse the computational cost of model checking w.r.t. weak extensions, stable expansions
and N-expansions and take a look at the complexity of model checking for disjunction-free
default theories. Furthermore, we show that not only for disjunction-free default theories, but
also for a larger class of default theories, which we call default theories in extended Horn
normal form, the complexity of model checking is, in the case of normal default theories,
tractable. Additionally, the complexity results are used to draw some interesting conclusions
on translatability issues. In particular, there exists no function from default logic into logic
programming which is polynomial, faithful and modular unless coNP = P2 . Finally, we give
an overview of our results concerning model checking in case of disjunctive default logic and
stationary default logic. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The complexity of default reasoning, i.e. determining whether a given formula can
be inferred from at least one extension of a given default theory (brave reasoning)
or whether it can be inferred from all extensions of a given default theory (cautious
reasoning) is already well understood in literature (see Section 2) [8,25]. However,
here we choose an alternative approach in search for a model-based representation
by looking at the complexity of the model checking problem instead of the inference
problem.
As Halpern and Vardi [11] argue, model checking is a beneEcial alternative sim-
plifying reasoning tasks (for instance, in classical propositional logic, a polynomial
algorithm can be used for model checking, however reasoning is coNP-complete);
moreover, in the context of model checking, the knowledge of an agent is represented
as a semantic structure instead of a collection of formulae and additionally, this ap-
proach introduces a kind of closed-world assumption. Furthermore, the complexity of
model checking is closely related to the notion of representational succinctness [7] of
non-monotonic formalisms.
Liberatore and Schaerf [15] discuss model checking for several default logics and
show that in general this problem is P2 -complete, even for semi-normal prerequisite-
free default theories. In the case of normal default theories, model checking is eas-
ier than the corresponding reasoning task—they show that the problem is in P2 and
P2 [O(log n)]-hard, and coNP-complete if the defaults are also prerequisite-free. We
strengthen their results with a non-trivial membership proof to a completeness result
for the class P2 [O(log n)]. To obtain this result in Section 4 (with a proof consisting
of four steps) we state some observations and lemmata in Section 3.
In Section 5 we deal with the complexity of model checking for disjunction-free
default theories, namely theories where prerequisites, justiEcations and consequents
are limited to be conjunctions of positive and negative literals, and introduce a class
of default theories, called default theories in extended Horn normal form (EHNF),
which does not raise the complexity of model checking w.r.t. disjunction-free de-
fault theories. Normal EHNF default theories even admit a tractable model checking
problem—this is an ample class of default theories and hence very useful in practical
applications.
Additionally, we investigate the complexity of model checking considering weak
extensions of a default theory (Section 6) and use these results to obtain complexity
results for propositional model checking in autoepistemic logic and logic N in Sec-
tion 7.
Furthermore, in Section 8, the complexity results are used to draw some interesting
conclusions w.r.t. translatability issues. In particular, we show that there exist no poly-
nomial, faithful and modular translations (as deEned in Section 8) from various variants
of default logic into logic programming unless coNP=P2 . Additionally, in the Enal
sections we summarise all the results and state additional model checking complexity
results we proved for several cases of disjunctive default logic and stationary default
logic.
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2. Basic concepts
A propositional default theory [21] is a pair 〈D;W 〉 where W is a Enite set of propo-
sitional sentences and D is a Enite set of defaults. Whenever we use the
term default theory in the rest of the paper, we refer to a propositional default
theory.
A default d is a conEguration of the form
	 :M1; : : : ; Mn
!
where 	; i; ! are propositional sentences. Usually, 	 is called the prerequisite of d and
is referred to as p(d), the (non-empty) set {1; : : : ; n} is referred to as the justiEcation
of d and denoted by j(d); ! is called the consequent of the default d and is referred
to as c(d). For convenience we deEne c(H)= {c(d) |d∈H}, if j(d) is a singleton we
identify it with its only element, and we normally omit the ‘M ’ in front of justiEcations.
Denition 1 (Reiter [21]). Let = 〈D;W 〉 be a default theory. For any set S of propo-
sitional formulae, (S) is the smallest subset U satisfying the following three proper-
ties:
(1) W ⊆U ,
(2) U is deductively closed.
(3) If (	 : M1; : : : ; Mn)=!∈D and 	∈U and ∀i :¬i =∈ S, then !∈U .
An extension of = 〈D;W 〉 is a Exed point of , i.e. a set E of propositional formulae
satisfying (E)=E.
This Exed point construction achieves that an extension is minimal in the sense
that it does not contain unfounded formulae. Property (3) achieves that an extension is
maximal in the sense that a maximum number of applicable defaults is used (therefore,
if F ⊆E, then at most one of F or E can be an extension).
Example 2. Consider the following default theory 〈D;W 〉:
W = {child}; D =
{
child : hungry
hungry
;
child : ¬hungry
sleeping
;
hungry : watchtv
¬sleeping
}
The unique extension of this default theory is the closure of
{child; hungry;¬sleeping}:
There are various other equivalent characterisations of extensions. In this paper we
normally use a kind of quasi-inductive characterisation, based on the base operator BD
due to Marek and TruszczyKnski (see Theorem 3:11 and Examples 3:32 to 3:39 in [18];
although we use this characterisation, we will not follow exactly the same syntax as
[18]).
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Denition 3. Let = 〈D;W 〉 be a default theory and S and U be subsets of c(D).
Then the operator BDS is deEned as
BDS (U ) =U ∪ {c(d) |p(d) : j(d)=c(d) ∈ D with
U |= p(d) and S |= ¬i for all i ∈ j(d)}:
Let BDS ↑ ! be the inEnite application of the operator BDS on itself.
We deEne cons(A) as usual as {# |A |=#}. We refer to S as context. If the iteration
is started with W and the Exed-point E=BDS (W ) ↑! is identical to the context S; E
is an extension:
Observation 4 (Marek and TruszczyKnski [18]). cons(E) is an extension of 〈D;W 〉 i7
E=BDE (W ) ↑!.
Instead of using the operator BD we normally use an equivalent iterative formulation.
Let H be a subset of D:
H0 = ∅;
Hk+1 = {d |d ∈ D with
W ∪ c(Hk) |= p(d) and W ∪ c(H) |= ¬i for all i ∈ j(d)}:
As we limit ourselves to Enite default theories it can easily be seen that at lat-
est after |D| steps a Exed point has been reached. W ∪ c(H) acts as the context.
E= cons(W ∪ c(H|D|)) is an extension of 〈D;W 〉 iM H|D|≡H .
Observation 5. Every extension is of the form E= cons(W ∪ c(GD(D; E))) with GD
being called the generating defaults of the extension E. An extension can be 8nitely
characterised using its generating defaults GD(D; E)⊆D.
A normal default theory is a default theory in which j(d)= c(d) for all defaults
(remind the fact, that we identify j(d) with its only element if j(d) is a singleton).
A semi-normal default theory is a theory in which each j(d) is of the form f(d)∧c(d)
where f(d) is an arbitrary propositional formulae. For other undeEned concepts w.r.t.
Reiter’s default logic we refer the reader to [21].
Denition 6. An interpretation (valuation) M is a model of  iM M is model of at
least one (consistent) extension of .
The Model Checking problem for default logic is to decide, w.r.t. a given interpreta-
tion M and a given default theory , if M |=. Whenever we use the term model we
refer to propositional Herbrand model. In the propositional case, a Herbrand model is
the set of propositional variables that are true in a truth assignment. For convenience,
we sometimes use the term model instead of interpretation.
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Recently, Rosati [22] introduced a diMerent notion of model checking, which is a kind
of extension checking, whereas our notion is in the general case based on extension
8nding.
Example 7. Consider again the example default theory 〈D;W 〉 presented at the begin-
ning of this section. The interpretation M= {child; hungry} is a model of 〈D;W 〉 (i.e.,
¬sleeping and ¬watchtv are true in this interpretation).
Short review of relevant complexity concepts. The notion of completeness we employ
is based on many-one polynomial transformability. Recall that the classes Pk ; 
P
k and
+Pk of the polynomial time hierarchy (PH)
1 are deEned as
P0 = 
P
0 =+
P
0 = P
and for all k¿0,
Pk+1 = P
Pk ; Pk+1 = NP
Pk ; +Pk+1 = co− Pk+1:
In particular, NP=P1 ; coNP=+
P
1 and 
P
2 =P
NP. Thus P2 is the class of decision
problems that are solvable in polynomial time on a deterministic oracle Turing machine
that makes polynomially many calls to an NP oracle.
The classes Pk have been reEned depending of how many oracle calls are needed:
Of special interest in this paper is the class PNP[O(log n)], also called P2 [O(log n)], of
decision problems solvable with a logarithmic number of calls to an NP-oracle.
A survey on already known complexity results for several non-monotonic logics can
be found in [3,20]. Gottlob, and independently, Stillman, showed, that the complexity
of the question if a formula f is in at least one extension of a given default theory
(brave reasoning) is P2 -complete, even in the case of normal and prerequisite-free
default theories, and even if f is a single literal; additionally, cautious reasoning is
+P2 -complete [8,25].
In some hardness proofs we use QBF for reduction: quanti8ed boolean formula are
propositional formulae with a second-order quantiEer preEx: ∃ stands for there is a
truth evaluation for these variables and ∀ stands for for all truth evaluations of these
variables. Allowing an arbitrary number of quantiEer alternations—with no restriction
where which quantiEer is allowed to occur—this problem is PSPACE-complete. How-
ever, restricting the number of quantiEers, and specifying the starting quantiEer, the
problem is complete for the respective classes of the polynomial hierarchy. QBFk;∃ is
the problem of deciding whether the formula
∃P∀Q∃R : : : F(P;Q; R; : : :)
with k quantiEer alternations is valid. Is this formula valid, i.e., does there exist an
evaluation of the variables in P that for each evaluation of the variables of Q there is
an evaluation of the variables in R : : : that F(P;Q; R; : : :) is true?
1 We always implicitely assume that P =NP and that the PH does not collapse.
596 R. Baumgartner, G. Gottlob / Theoretical Computer Science 289 (2002) 591–627
3. Some useful tools
Denition 8. A monotonic rule system 〈R;W 〉 consists of a Enite set
R =
{
	1
.1
; : : : ;
	n
.n
}
of propositional inference rules and a set W of propositional sentences.
Observation 9. Let 〈D;W 〉 be a normal default theory. If the consequents of all
defaults are jointly consistent and consistent with W , then there are no mutually
incompatible defaults and thus there exists only one extension.
This observation was proved in [16, Corrollary 4:10]. To give the reader some mo-
tivation, consider the above quasi-inductive characterisation of extensions. In a normal
default theory, the consequent of a default theory is the same as its justiEcation. In
this setting, it always holds that W ∪ c(H) |=¬j(d), therefore the quasi-inductive char-
acterisation turns into an inductive one. Hence, it is independent of any context and
generates a unique extension.
Proposition 10. Let 〈R;W 〉 be a monotonic rule system (or a normal or justi8cation-
free default theory) where W and all the consequents bi of R= {a1=b1; : : : an=bn} jointly
consistent. Then k rules of R or more do not 8re i7 it is possible to choose a set
B⊆R with |B|= k and k interpretations I1; : : :Ik in such a way that
(1) ∀j (16j6k) :Ij |=W;
(2) ∀j ∀b∈R\B :Ij |= b;
(3) ∀a∈B ∃j :Ij |= a:
Proof. The statement that k rules or more do not Ere is equivalent to the existence of
a set B with |B|= k rules which are not used. This is equivalent to the statement that
it is not possible to infer the prerequisites of the rules of B from W and the use of
the consequents b∈ c(R\B) of R\B. Of course, it is maybe impossible to infer some
of the prerequisites of the rules in R\B, too, therefore there are maybe more than k
rules which do not Ere—however, all that is needed is that at least k rules do not Ere.
Formally,
∀a ∈ B : W ∧ c(R\B) |= a
Due to our requirements the conjunction of W with c(R\B) is always consistent (and
hence forbids that a could be inferred trivially). Furthermore, we know that v |=w is
equivalent to the existence of an interpretation I with I |= v and I |=w. In this case,
∀a ∈ B ∃I : I |= W ∧ c(R\B);I |= a
Therefore,
∀j : Ij |= W ∧ c(R\B)
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and
∀a ∈ B ∃j : Ij |= a
Finally, since I |= v ∧ w iM I |= v and I |=w, we achieve that this is equivalent to
∀j :Ij |= W
∀j ∀b ∈ R\B :Ij |= b
∀a ∈ B ∃j :Ij |= a
All steps of the proof can be carried out in the reverse direction, too, therefore we
have shown equivalence of these both statements.
The following proposition formalises a technique (binary search) that is well known
in literature [20,26].
Proposition 11. Let a(I1; : : : ; In) be a function of n instances of a problem into N, and
additionally let a(I1; : : : ; In) be polynomially bounded in n, i.e. a(I1; : : : ; In)6p(n) for
some polynomial p(n). If the problem of deciding a(I1; : : : ; In)6r is in NP, then the
computation of a(I1; : : : ; In) is possible in polynomial time requiring O(log n) oracle
calls 2 (the corresponding decision problem whether a(I1; : : : ; In) is odd is hence in
PNP[O log n]).
Proof. Start with calling the oracle for r= p(n)=2. If the answer for a6p(n)=2
is yes, then in the next step choose r= p(n)=4, if no, then choose r= 3p(n)=4
and continue the same procedure on the following answers. With this binary search
the oracle Turing machine with oracle in NP is able to determine a(I1; : : : ; In) after x
oracle calls with 2x =p(n), that is x= log2 p(n) oracle calls, which is of O(log n);
therefore this computation problem requires only a logarithmic number of calls to an
NP-oracle. The proof is analogous for a(I1; : : : ; In)¿r.
For instance a(I1; : : : ; In) could be the number of rules of a monotonic rule system
(with n rules) which cannot be applied; or another example is that a(SAT1; : : : ;SATn)
is the number of SAT-instances which can be satisEed out of a number of n such
instances (SAToddn ). In both cases, a is trivially polynomially bounded, since a6n.
The proposition equally holds in the case of greater or equal instead of lesser or evil.
To conclude this section, let us state some observations, which can be derived in
a straightforward way by results in [16]. These are used and referred to in the next
section.
Observation 12. M is a model of a default theory 〈D;W 〉 i7 there exists an extension
of 〈D;W 〉 generated by a subset G1⊆G, where G= {d |M |= c(d)}.
2 In the main proof of the next section these computations are only needed as intermediate steps in a
decision problem, hence there is no need to deal with complexity classes of functions.
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Observation 13. Each normal default theory has at most one extension E (gener-
ated by G1⊆G where G= {d |M |= c(d)}) w.r.t. a given model M, i.e. at most one
extension E with M |=E.
However, it is possible that more than one “extension” in the sense F = cons(W ∪
{c(d) |F |=p(d); F |=¬i ∀i ∈ j(d)}) exists—this is the deEnition of weak extensions
(see also Section 6); for instance
D = {a : b=b; b : a=a; : c=c}
has two weak extensions, namely cons{a; b; c} and cons{c}; however only cons{c}
forms an extension.
Observation 14. Let E be an extension of the default theory 〈G;W 〉 and G⊆D; then
E is an extension of 〈D;W 〉 i7 for each default d in D\G, W ∧ c(GD(G; E)) |=p(d)
or W ∧ c(GD(G; E)) |=¬i for at least one i with i ∈ j(d).
4. Model checking for normal default theories is P2 [O(log n)]-complete
Theorem 15. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a (not necessarily prerequisite-
free) normal default theory. Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is in P2 [O(log n)].
Proof. We describe a Turing machine M which decides this problem in polynomial
time using an NP-oracle for only O(log n) times. M works in four steps. A normal
default theory 〈D;W 〉 with n defaults is of the form D= {	1 : 1=1; : : : ; 	n : n=n}.
Step 1: M checks whether M |=W . Since each extension contains W , M can only
be a model of 〈D;W 〉 if M satisEes W .
Furthermore, M determines the set G⊆D as the set of all defaults d withM |= c(d).
This step eliminates all undesired (“bad”) defaults B=D\G. None of the defaults of
B shall Ere in this construction of an extension, or M is not a model of this extension
(Observation 12).
The check whetherM |=W and the construction of G can be achieved in polynomial
time, because model checking for propositional formulae is tractable. In the following,
let m be the cardinality of |G|.
Step 2: M now computes the cardinality of the set G1 of generating defaults of the
extension, i.e. of defaults in G which are applicable because their prerequisites can
be inferred. Because of Observation 9 the set cons(W ∪ c(G1)) is unique and hence
also a unique G1 exists (in G there are no defaults that block each other—due to the
construction of G all consequents, and therefore all justiEcations, are jointly consistent;
see also Observation 13).
The machine M assumes that E= cons(W ∪ c(G1)) is an extension and in Steps 3
and 4 M will verify that none of the “bad” defaults Eres (using the results of Observ-
ations 13 and 14), because then this set of generating defaults really forms an
extension.
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To compute the cardinality of G1, M determines the number |G2|= |G\G1| of good
defaults that do not Ere. It is easy to see that we can identify 〈G;W 〉 with a monotonic
rule system 〈R;W 〉 in which all consequents are jointly consistent and use the results
of the lemmata of the previous section:
Claim. The problem to decide if at least r rules of a monotonic rule system (in n
rules) do not 8re is in NP (i.e. |G2|¿r).
Proof. The machine guesses a data-structure 〈G′2; {I1; : : : ;Ir}〉 with |G′2|= r. G′2 is a set
of defaults (rules), the Ij (16j6r) are interpretations. Now M proves in polynomial
time (using the monotonic rule system syntax of Proposition 10):
∀j: Ij |= W
∀j ∀b ∈ R\G′2: Ij |= b
∀a ∈ G′2 ∃j: Ij |= a
M initially called an oracle in NP and then polynomially tests the guessed G′2 and
the r guessed interpretations. Due to Proposition 10 this is equivalent to the question
if at least r rules do not Ere (an intuitive explanation why it is possible to guess a
data-structure is, that the question is of the form of ∃G′2 : : : f |= g?; the fact that “|=”
is required to guess a structure instead of more than one guessing stage is important as
inference is coNP-complete, hence the converse problem is NP-complete, and as shown
this question is equivalent to the question ∃G′2∃I1 : : :∃Ir : : :?—preceding a polynomial
procedure only existential quantiEers occur, which can be guessed in a single step
(logical characterisation of complexity classes)).
The exact computation of the number t of rules which do not Ere can, due to
Proposition 11, be fulElled in polynomial time (see also the discussion following the
referred proposition) with a logarithmic number (logm) of calls to an NP-oracle. After
concluding this step, M knows |G2|= t, hence |G1|=m−t. Observe, that we only know
the cardinality of G2, but not G2 itself which is only in the oracle (and hence needs
to be guessed again in the next step).
Step 3: M now has to prove that none of the “bad” defaults is applicable, because
then the assumption that G1 is a set of generating defaults is valid.
If it can be shown that W ∪ c(G1) |=p(d) and W ∧ c(G1)∧ j(d) is consistent for
at least one d∈B=D\G, then G1 is not a set of generating defaults and the given
interpretation M is not a model for 〈D;W 〉. So it must be shown that for all “bad”
defaults at least one of these two conditions is not fulElled. Then, cons(W ∪ c(G1)) is
an extension E of 〈D;W 〉 (Observation 14) and M |=E, so M is a model of 〈D;W 〉.
Two types of “bad” defaults need to be distinguished. There is one set B1 consisting
of defaults in which the prerequisites are not applicable, formally
B1 = {di ∈ B |W ∪ c(G1) |= p(di)}:
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B2 =B\B1 is the set of defaults of B in which the prerequisites are applicable. The
goal is now to determine the exact number u of defaults in B1. Then M is able (in
the fourth step) to test for each default in B2 if the justiEcations are consistent with
W ∧ c(G1) after guessing the right G1 and B1.
|D|=n︷ ︸︸ ︷
|G|=m︷ ︸︸ ︷
G1︸︷︷︸
|G1|=m−t
G2︸︷︷︸
|G2|=t
|B|=n−m︷ ︸︸ ︷
B1︸︷︷︸
|B1|=u
B2︸︷︷︸
|B2|=n−m−u
Claim. The problem to decide, given the cardinality of G1, if the number of defaults
in B1 is at least s is in NP.
Proof. For a given s, M guesses a data-structure
〈G1 ⊆ G; {N1; : : : ;Nt}; B′1 ⊆ B; {O1; : : : ;Os}〉
with |G1|=m − t, |B′1|= s, and where Ne and Oy are interpretations. Now, M proves
in polynomial time:
• ∀d∈G2 =G\G1 there exists an interpretation Ne (16e6t) with Ne |=p(d); and
∀e :Ne |=W ∧ c(G1) (In Step 2, M was provided with the information about the
cardinality of G1, therefore M has now just to guess a G1 of suitable cardinality
and test if it is the right one.).
• ∀d∈B′1 there exists an interpretation Oy (16y6s) such that Oy |=p(d); and ∀y :Oy |=
W ∧ c(G1). If it is possible to choose the Oy this way then there are at least s not
applicable prerequisites of defaults, hence |B1|¿s. This is not an application of
Proposition 10 because there is a Exed set c(G1)—there is no need to know the
consequents of B′1 (This statement is equivalent to ∀d∈B′1 :W ∪ c(G1) |=p(d).).
Both steps can be performed in polynomial time and are due to the initial guess in
NP.
Due to Proposition 11, u= |B1| can be computed with log(n− m) oracle-calls.
Step 4: In the previous steps M has determined the cardinality of B1 and of G1. Now
the machine Enally has to check that W ∧ c(G1)∧ j(d) is inconsistent for all defaults
d∈B2 (if yes, then G1 is a generating set).
To this end, let us show that the converse problem is in NP and introduce a machine
N solving the converse problem.
Claim. The problem to decide if W ∧ c(G)∧ j(d) is consistent for at least one d∈B2,
given the cardinality of G1 and B1, is in NP.
Proof. Machine N guesses a data structure
〈G1 ⊆ G; {N1; : : : ;Nt}; B1 ⊆ B; {P1; : : : ;Pu};Q〉
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with |G1|=m− t and |B1|= u. Now N tests in polynomial time:
• ∀d∈G2 =G\G1 there exists interpretations Ne (16e6t) with Ne |=p(d); and ∀e :
Ne |=W ∧ c(G1)
• ∀d∈B1 there exists interpretations P (16z6u) such that Pz |=p(d); and ∀z :Pz |=
W ∧ c(G1). N knows the cardinality of B1 (step 3), therefore N just needs to show
that it has guessed the right B1.
• Now N just needs to prove that ∃d∈B2 :Q |=W ∧ c(G1) and Q |= c(d) (with c(d)=
j(d)). This states the fact that there is a default which is consistent with cons(W ∪
c(G1)).
All steps can be concluded in polynomial time and are, due to the initial guess, in
NP. (Intuitively, the problem of machine N is of the form: ∃G1∃B1∀Q (a∧ b⇒ c).
Thus, the converse problem is ∀G1∀B1∃Q (a∧ b∧ ¬c). However, as the cardinality of
G1 and B1 is known from the previous steps it does not matter if the question includes
∀G1 which fulEll a special property a or ∃G1 with a special property a, as there is
exactly one G1 of this cardinality, hence a data-structure can be guessed.).
This means, that the output yes of the oracle Turing-machine N is achieved iM there
exist defaults of B2 which Ere (with guessing the right G1, the right B1 and a suitable
Q). We deEne that the Turing-machine M rejects on output yes and accepts on output
no (getting the answer no means that no default of B2 is consistent with the extension).
This converse problem therefore needs one (negative) oracle call.
Overall, we showed that Step 1 can be accomplished in polynomial time, Step 2
in polynomial time with logm oracle calls. Step 3 was concluded after at most
log(n−m) oracle calls and Step 4 just needed one oracle call. Therefore, this problem
is solvable in polynomial time with log(m(n−1))+1=O(log n) calls to three diMerent
oracles in NP.
For the sake of a simpler presentation we have described three diMerent NP-oracles
(the three oracles of Step 2, 3, 4, respectively). With standard techniques, these three
oracles of course can be replaced with a single oracle. Hence this problem is in the
class P2 [O(log n)].
In Fig. 1, the algorithm of the membership proof of the above theorem is represented
in a compact way (however, for ease of readability, not every detail is described, for
instance quantiEers are used instead of “for . . . do” declarations (such as in Fig. 3) and
auxiliary procedures like “function |= (N : interpretation, F : formula): boolean;” are not
described). Moreover, “guess” means that an appropriate set for the check occurring
after the guessing step is guessed, if one exists. If the corresponding check using the
guessed set results evaluates to yes=reject, the problem is in coNP.
The following example illustrates the sets of good and bad defaults in the proof of
Theorem 15.
Example 16. Consider M= {b; c; d}. The defaults of the default theory
{¬a ∧ b : c
c
;
: ¬a
¬a ;
: a ∨ b
a ∨ b ;
: ¬b
¬b ;
c : ¬d
¬d ;
d : b
b
;
¬b : a ∧ c
a ∧ c
}
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Input: An interpretation M, a normal default theory 〈D;W 〉.
Result: “Accept” if M |= 〈D;W 〉; “Reject” otherwise.
begin
if M |=W then reject and halt;
G := {d |M |= c(d)}; m := |G|;
x := 1; r := int(m=2 + 1);
while 2x−16m do
begin
x := x + 1; |G′2| := r;
guess 〈G′2; {I1; : : : ;Ir}〉;
if ∀j :Ij |=W; ∀d∈D\G′2 ∀j :Ij |= c(d); ∀d∈G′2 ∃j :Ij |=p(d)
then r := r + int(m=(2x) + 1)
else r := r − int(m=(2x) + 1);
end;
if ∀j :Ij |=W; ∀d∈D\G′2 ∀j :Ij |= c(d); ∀d∈G′2 ∃j :Ij |=p(d)
then |G1| :=m− r else |G1| :=m− (r − 1);
x := 1; s := int((n− m)=2 + 1);
while 2x−16n− m do
begin
x := x + 1; |B′1| := s;
guess 〈G1⊆G; {I1; : : : ;I|G2|}; B′1⊆B; {O1; : : : ;Os}〉;
if ∀j :Ij |=W; ∀d∈G1 ∀j :Ij |= c(d); ∀d∈G2 ∃j :Ij |=p(d)
and ∀y :Oy |=W ∧ c(G1); ∀d∈B′1 ∃y :Oy |=p(d)
then s := s + int((n− m)=(2x) + 1)
else s := s− int((n− m)=(2x) + 1);
end;
if ∀j Ij |=W; ∀d∈G1 ∀j :Ij |= c(d); ∀d∈G2 ∃j :Ij |=p(d)
and ∀y :Oy |=W ∧ c(G1); ∀d∈B′1 ∃y :Oy |=p(d)
then |B1| := s else |B1| := s− 1;
guess 〈G1⊆G; {I1; : : : ;I|G2|}; B1⊆B; {O1; : : : ;O|B1|};Q〉;
if ∀j :Ij |=W; ∀d∈G1 ∀j :Ij |= c(d); ∀d∈G2 ∃j :Ij |=p(d)
and ∀y :Oy |=W ∧ c(G1); ∀d∈B1 ∃y :Oy |=p(d)
and ∃d∈B2 :Q |=W ∧ c(G1)∧ c(d)
then reject else accept;
end.
Fig. 1. Deterministic algorithm of Theorem 15 using O(log n) oracle calls.
are split into
G =
{¬a ∧ b : c
c
;
: ¬a
¬a ;
: a ∨ b
a ∨ b ;
d : b
b
}
and B =
{
: ¬b
¬b ;
c : ¬d
¬d ;
¬b : a ∧ c
a ∧ c
}
by the technique of the above proof.
Then the cardinality of G1 and B1 is determined; and Enally checked if no justiEca-
tion of B1 is applicable. Fig. 2 shows the categories in which each defaults falls. As
illustrated, one default of B1 Eres due to the applicable prerequisite.
The completeness result of model checking for normal default theories follows di-
rectly from the results of [15], however, we sketch an alternative proof which might
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Fig. 2. Good and bad defaults of Example 16.
be more intuitive to some readers, using a well-known problem for reduction. The
following proposition is required for the alternative hardness proof.
Proposition 17 (Wagner [26]). The problem to decide, given the quanti8ed boolean
formulae F1; : : : Fn, such that Fi =∈QBFk;∃ implies Fi+1 =∈QBFk;∃ for 16i6n, whether
max{i : 16i6n; Fi ∈QBFk;∃} is odd, is Pk+1[O(log n)]-complete.
Corollary 18. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a not necessarily pre-requisite-
free normal default theory 〈D;W 〉. Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is PNP[O(log n)]-
complete.
Proof (Sketch). To show hardness, we use a reduction of the problem mentioned in
Proposition 17 for P2 [O(log n)]: This is the problem to decide, whether, given n for-
mulae Fi such that Fi is not satisEable implies that Fi+1 is not satisEable, the number
of satisEable formulae is odd.
Let zj (16j6m) be the propositional atoms which appear in the formulae F1; : : : ; Fn
(and, although not necessary here, it can be assumed that the atoms of each two
formulae are disjoint). We construct, if n is odd, the following default theory:
W =
⋃
i
{(¬Fi ∨ ¬xi−1)⇒ ¬xi}
D=
{¬x1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬xn : x0
x0
;
¬x3 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬xn : x0 ∧ x1 ∧ x2
x0 ∧ x1 ∧ x2 ;
¬x5 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬xn : x0 ∧ x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4
x0 ∧ x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ; : : : ;
¬xn : x0 ∧ x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn−1
x0 ∧ x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn−1
}
For n is even, a similar default theory can be used. In this default theory, the new
propositional atoms x0, x1; : : : ; xn and (in the Fi only) the old atoms zj (16j6m) are
occurring. The transformation is clearly polynomial. It can be shown that the empty
set is a model of 〈D;W 〉 iM the number of satisEable formulae is odd.
Corollary 19. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a prerequisite-free normal de-
fault theory 〈D;W 〉. Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is in coNP.
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Input: An interpretation M, a normal prer.-free default theory 〈D;W 〉.
Result: “Accept” if M |= 〈D;W 〉; “Reject” otherwise.
begin
guess Q;
if M |=W then reject and halt;
G := {d |M |= c(d)};
for each d∈D\G do
begin
if Q |=W ∧ c(G)∧ c(d) then reject and halt;
end;
accept;
end.
Fig. 3. Converse non-deterministic algorithm of Corollary 19.
Proof. This fact, which is also proved in [15] immediately follows from the proof of
Theorem 15, because Steps 2 and 3 are not needed and it is suScient to guess a Q in
Step 4 for prerequisite-free default theories which is clearly in coNP (Fig. 3).
5. Complexity of model checking for disjunction-free and EHNF default theories
We introduce a class of default theories in “extended Horn normal form” (EHNF
default theories) with a model checking problem which is one level easier than in
general; to the best of our knowledge, no one so far has studied this class, probably
because reasoning is still NP-complete (if the syntax of the given formula is also
restricted), even in the case of prerequisite-free normal default theories.
As special case disjunction-free default theories are analysed, where the computa-
tional cost of model checking resides in the same class as for EHNF default theories.
A default theory 〈D;W 〉 is disjunction free, if W , all p(d), all elements of each
j(d), and all consequents c(d) are conjunctions of (negated and not negated) literals.
The complexity of reasoning in disjunction-free default theories is already well un-
derstood; Kautz and Selman [14,23] dealt with the problem of inference for limited
classes of default theories like disjunction-free default theories: Brave reasoning (with
disjunction-free formulae) is proven to be NP-complete, even in the case of normal
default theories (although Ending an extension is polynomial in that case) and even if
the formula, which should be inferred of at least one extension, is a single literal.
Brave (and cautious) reasoning is polynomial if a normal default theory is fur-
thermore restricted to be prerequisite-free; however, even only allowing W to be a
Horn-theory instead a conjunction of literals raises the complexity to NP-completeness
[24].
We prove that the complexity of model checking is polynomial in the case of normal
disjunction-free default theories and NP-complete in the case of general disjunction-
free default theories, even if limited to prerequisite-free ones. Moreover, as mentioned
above, we introduce the ample class of default theories in extended Horn normal form
and show that the problem still remains in the corresponding classes.
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A Horn clause is a disjunction of literals with at most one positive literal. A Horn
theory is a conjunction of Horn clauses. A dual Horn clause is a conjunction of literals
containing at most one negative literal. A dual Horn theory is a disjunction of dual
Horn clauses.
Denition 20. A default theory 〈D;W 〉 is in extended Horn normal form (EHNF) iM
W and all elements of each j(d) are disjunctions of Horn theories, each p(d) is
a conjunction of dual Horn theories, and each consequent c(d) is a Horn theory. If
〈D;W 〉 is normal, then trivially, the only element of each j(d) is simply a Horn theory,
too.
The class of EHNF default theories is a superset of the class of disjunction-free
default theories: Simply limit W and each i to one Horn theory with only one-element
Horn clauses, limit each c(d) to a Horn theory with unary clauses, too; and let each
p(d) be a conjunction of one-element dual Horn theories.
Example 21. Let L be a propositional language consisting of the set of atoms {p; q; r;
s; t}. Then, the default theory 〈D;W 〉 where
W = {p ∧ ¬r};
and
D =
{
p : ¬r;¬s ∧ q
q
;
¬t : ¬s
¬t ∧ p
}
is a disjunction-free default theory. The default theory 〈D;W 〉 with
W = {((p ∨ ¬r) ∧ (¬s ∨ ¬p)) ∨ t};
D =
{
((p ∧ r) ∨ q) ∧ s ∧ t) : p ∨ q ∨ ¬s
(p ∨ ¬r) ∧ q
}
is an EHNF default theory.
EHNF default theories admit very complicated defaults—such as
((s∧p∧¬q) ∨ (q∧ r) ∨ ¬t))∧ ((v∧w) ∨ (p∧¬q)) : p ∨ r ∨ s; p ∨ (q∧ s); v∧w
(p∧¬r)∧ (q ∨ ¬v ∨ ¬w)∧w :
(observe that each justiEcation is here a disjunction of Horn theories).
The class of EHNF theories is an ample class of default theories which exhibits, as
proved below, favourable complexity results. Therefore, it is a very useful class which
can extend the set of used default theories for many practical applications so far using
more restricted versions of default logic. Moreover, consider examples of propositional
default theories used in several papers—most of these fall into the EHNF class, or are
even disjunction free.
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5.1. General case
Lemma 22. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 an EHNF default theory. De-
ciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is in NP.
Proof. A non-deterministic polynomial-time Turing-machine M solving this problem
is described as follows (see also Fig. 4). After this description, we will argue why
all satisEability checks and inference checks can be done in polynomial time. M starts
with guessing a set G ⊆ D. M computes
Gi+1 = {d |d ∈ D;W ∪ c(Gi) |= p(d);∀i ∈ j(d)W ∧ c(G) |= ¬i}
with G0 = ∅ up to Gn where n is the number of defaults in D. Remember that all
Gi are Enite sets of formulae. To compute G|D|, only a polynomial number of infer-
ence checks and satisEability checks is required. Additionally, M needs to check if
cons(W ∪ c(G|D|)) is an extension. Hence, M shows that G≡Gn (and stores the set of
used defaults in each step of the computation).
Finally, M just needs to show that M is a model of this extension, hence M needs
to show that M |=W ∧ c(G)—since propositional model checking is tractable, this can
be accomplished in polynomial time.
To show that all satisEability and inference problems can be decided in polynomial
time observe that deciding satisEability of a Horn theory and tautology checking of a
dual Horn theory (which is equivalent to the question if a Horn theory is not satisEable)
is polynomial. Furthermore, the question sat(f1 ∨ · · · ∨fm)? is equivalent to sat(f1) or
. . . or sat(fm) and taut(f1 ∧ · · · ∧fm)? is equivalent to taut(f1) and . . . and taut(fm).
The satisEability checks of this problem are of the form W ∧ c(G) |=¬i, which is
equivalent to sat(W ∧ c(G)∧ i). Let m be the maximum number of disjunctions of
Horn theories in W and of all i of each j(d). Then the disjunctions can be split with
O(m2) steps to at most m2 disjunctions of Horn theories of the form Wk ∧ c(G)∧ il
where W =W1 ∨ · · · ∨Wk ∨ · · · ∨W6m and i = i1 ∧ · · · ∧ · · · ∧il ∧ · · · ∧i;6m. Due to
the above remarks the satisEability checks can be split to at most m2 checks sat(Wk ∧
c(G)∧ il) where at least one check must be successful to achieve that the overall
checking procedure yields a positive answer; for each j(d) consisting of a maximum
number of p justiEcations, O(pm2) checks are needed. Each check is polynomial
since each formula is a Horn theory and satisEability checking for Horn theories is
polynomial.
One could even think about allowing some of the c(d) to be a disjunction of Horn
theories: However, if all c(d) are allowed to be disjunctions of Horn theories, the
problem would require O(mn) splits and turn into an intractable problem. Even if only
a logarithmic number log(n) of consequents would be allowed to be a disjunction of
Horn theories, this algorithm cannot be successfully generalised in a way to remain
polynomial (and probably there is no other polynomial algorithm for this problem),
as O(mlog n) is still of exponential order. Hence, only a Exed number of consequents
could be allowed to be disjunctions of Horn theories.
The inference checks W ∪ c(Gi) |=p(d) with Ei =W ∪ c(Gi) are due to the deduc-
tion theorem equivalent to |=¬Ei ∨p(d). ¬(Wk ∧ c(Gi)) is a dual Horn theory since
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Input: An interpretation M, a disjunction-free default theory 〈D;W 〉.
Result: “Accept” if M |= 〈D;W 〉; “Reject” otherwise.
begin
guess G ⊆ D;
i := 0; G(0) := ∅; disw := no. of disj. of Horn theories inW ;
while i6n do
begin
G(i + 1) :=G(i);
for each d∈D do
begin
disp := no. of conj. of dual Horn theories inp(d); x := 0;
for k := 1 to disw
begin
for l := 1 to disp
begin
if taut(¬Wk ∨¬ c(Gi)∨pl(d)) then x := x + 1;
end;
end;
if x= disw · disp then % i.e. all subformulae are tautologies
begin
x := 0; y := 0; nob := no. of i ∈ j(d)
for each i ∈ j(d) do
begin
disb := no. of disj. of Horn theories in i;
for k := 1 to disw
begin
for l := 1 to disb
begin
if sat(Wk ∧ c(G)∧ il(d)) then x := 1;
end;
end;
end;
y := y + x; x := 0;
end;
if y= nob and d =∈G(i + 1) then % y= nob iM each W ∧ c(G)∧ i satisf.
G(i + 1) :=G(i + 1)∪{d};
end;
i := i + 1;
end;
if G(n) = G then reject and halt;
if M |=W ∧ c(G) then reject and halt;
accept;
end.
Fig. 4. Non-deterministic algorithm of Lemma 22.
Wk ∧ c(Gi) is a set of Horn formulae. Similar as above, at most O(m2) conjunctions
are needed to split the formula ¬Ei ∨p(d) up to conjunctions of ¬Wk ∨¬c(Gi)∨pl(d).
Since tautology checking of conjunctions can be split as remarked above, and the for-
mula is a tautology if all of its conjunctions are tautologies, we face O(m2) tautology
tests where each check can be fulElled in polynomial time since only dual Horn theories
occur in each test.
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Corollary 23. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a disjunction-free default
theory. Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is in NP.
Lemma 24. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 an EHNF default theory. Decid-
ing whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is NP-hard, even if 〈D;W 〉 is prerequisite-free, semi-normal,
disjunction free and all consequents are single literals.
Proof. We use a reduction from 3SAT. Let F(t1; : : : ; tm) be a formula in conjunctive
normal form with exactly three literals per clause:
F = F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fi ∧ · · · ∧ Fn
with Fi = xi1 ∨ xi2 ∨ xi3 (the xij are literals, and the tk are propositional atoms occurring
in F). Deciding if F is satisEable is NP-complete.
We prove that F is satisEable iM M= ∅ is a model of the following default theory:
W = ∅:
D=
⋃
k
{
: uk ∧ ¬tk
¬tk ;
: tk ∧ ¬uk
¬uk
}
∪⋃
i
{
: f(xi1) ∧ ¬yi
¬yi ;
: f(xi2) ∧ ¬yi
¬yi ;
: f(xi3) ∧ ¬yi
¬yi ;
: yi
yi
}
∪
{ : ¬y1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬yn ∧ ¬z
¬z ;
: z
z
}
with f(xij)=¬tk ∧ uk if xij =¬tk and f(xij)=¬uk ∧ tk if xij = tk .
This is a semi-normal prerequisite-free default theory 3 in the propositional atoms
{t1; : : : tm; u1; : : : ; um; y1; : : : ; yn; z}:
Intuitively, the new variables uk are introduced because it is required that the empty
set (i.e. the model in which all atoms are evaluated as false) is a model regardless
which evaluation of (t1; : : : ; tm) satisEes F . This default theory is semi-normal (If we
just used : ¬uk=¬uk and : ¬tk =¬tk instead, an extension could contain for any value of
k both of ¬uk and ¬tk ; in the above theory one default blocks the other and takes care
that for any k exactly one of ¬tk or ¬uk will be in the extension, hence representing
an evaluation of F .). “Disjunctions” which are necessary to represent F are used in
this theory via three defaults with the same consequence ¬yi.
The transformation is clearly polynomial, so it only remains to show that M= ∅ is
a model iM F is satisEable.
• M= ∅ is a model implies that M must be a model of an extension containing
¬z because every possible extension has to be a set where a maximum number of
possible defaults is used and hence must either contain z (from : z=z), or contain
¬z. It only contains ¬z if ¬y1 ∧ · · · ∧¬yn is consistent with the extension. This can
only then be accomplished if at least one of the three defaults with consequence
3 The last two defaults could be dropped without modifying the proof very much, however they are kept
for ease of argumentation.
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¬yi Eres, because if not, then, due to : yi=yi yi has to be used (this default theory
is total w.r.t. z and the yi) and the conjunction of the ¬yi would not be consistent
with the extension. The conjunction of all ¬yi will be consistent with the context, if
there is a combination of ¬ tk and ¬uk in the context (exactly one of them needs to
be in the context to have a chance that this context forms an extension) that allows
to infer all ¬yi, i.e. that for each i at least one of the three defaults yielding ¬yi is
applicable. If ¬uk is part of the combination, tk is true, if not (then ¬tk is in the
combination) tk is false. This is a propositional model which satisEes F (each clause
evaluates to true under this evaluation), therefore F is satisEable.
• F is satisEable implies that there is at least one truth evaluation N which satisEes
F . We construct an extension containing for each k ¬tk if tk is not in N and ¬uk
if tk is in N. For a Exed model N, N |=F is equivalent to N |=F1 and . . . and
N |=Fn. Therefore, in this extension, each ¬yi can be derived because at least one
of the justiEcations is consistent with the context and therefore due to the same
reasons, also ¬z. The set which contains for each k either ¬tk or ¬uk , and which
contains all ¬yi and ¬z, is a maximal set, because no justiEcation of another default
is consistent with it, and is, since all mentioned literals are inferred with this context,
too, an extension. This extension contains only negated literals, hence M= ∅ is a
model of the default theory.
Therefore, M= ∅ is a model iM F is satisEable.
In the above proof instead of using a prerequisite-free default theory an “almost”
normal default theory with prerequisites could be used:
D=
{
: u1 ∧ ¬t1
¬t1 ; : : : ;
: um ∧ ¬tm
¬tm ;
: t1 ∧ ¬u1
¬u1 ; : : : ;
: tm ∧ ¬um
¬um ;
f(x11) : ¬y1
¬y1 ;
f(x12) : ¬y1
¬y1 ;
f(x13) : ¬y1
¬y1 ; : : : ;
f(xn1) : ¬yn
¬yn ;
f(xn2) : ¬yn
¬yn ;
f(xn3) : ¬yn
¬yn ;
¬y1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬yn : ¬z
¬z ;
: z
z
}
:
In this case f(xij)=¬tk if xij =¬tk and f(xij)=¬uk if xij = tk . Since the f(xij) are
used as prerequisites here, they have to be inferred and need not only be consistent
with the context—in the context we had to use for instance ¬tk ∧ uk to avoid that an
unwanted default was used if ¬uk had been inferred, in the case of prerequisites we
do not want to infer positive literals.
If W = {¬u1⊕¬t1; : : : ;¬uk ⊕¬tk ; : : : ;¬um⊕¬tm} with ⊕ being the exclusive or
operator, then one might think that the above default theory could be represented
as a normal one replacing
⋃
k
{
: uk ∧ ¬tk
¬tk ;
: tk ∧ ¬uk
¬uk
}
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with
⋃
k
{
: ¬tk
¬tk ;
: ¬uk
¬uk
}
:
However, on the one hand, this W is not a Horn theory as required, since ¬uk ⊕¬tk =
(¬uk ∨¬tk)∧ (uk ∨ tk) (the second clause is not a Horn clause). On the other hand, the
more important problem is that this W deEnitely settles the value of tk if we knew uk
(and vice versa)—this is completely unwanted; the special property is that there shall
only be negated literals in an extension to get M= ∅ as model—here we would force
positive literals to be in the wanted extension, too (if ¬uk is part of the extension, then
tk is element of it, too). However, if we are allowed to use the e7ective disjunction
operator of disjunctive default theories we could deEne W (or special defaults without
prerequisites and justiEcations) as {¬u1|¬t1; : : : ;¬uk |¬tk ; : : : ;¬um|¬tm} and drop the
Erst defaults (see [6] for details on disjunctive default logic, and Section 9 of this
paper for further discussion) to achieve a normal default theory.
With the previous results, we immediately obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 25. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 an EHNF default theory. De-
ciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is NP-complete, even if 〈D;W 〉 is prerequisite free, semi-
normal, disjunction free and all consequents are single literals.
5.2. Normal default theories
We show that in the case of normal EHNF default theories model checking is
tractable and moreover, belongs to the hardest problems in P w.r.t. Logspace-reductions,
i.e. is P-complete. Compare this to the result of Section 4: Model checking with
normal default theories is P2 [O(log n)]-complete, which is equal to the class L
NP [20]
(usually we abbreviate the class of logarithmic space computations with L whereas for
reductions we use the term Logspace-reductions). For normal EHNF default theories
no oracle calls are necessary. However, we show that those oracle calls turn into P-hard
problems, hence this problem is P-hard (more precisely, if trying the same procedure
as in the corresponding proof in Theorem 15, then the oracle calls would remain due to
an exponential number of interpretations; and hence an alternative checking procedure
has to be used).
Lemma 26. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 an EHNF normal default theory.
Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is in P.
Proof. Let the input length m of this problem be the number of defaults multiplied
with the largest number of disjunctions of Horn theories in W or i, (resp. conjunctions
of dual Horn theories) in p(d), multiplied with the largest number of conjunctions of
all Horn theories (resp. disjunctions of dual Horn theories) and multiplied with the
largest number of disjunctions in the Horn clauses (resp. conjunctions in dual Horn
clauses).
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We describe a Turing machine M which decides this problem in polynomial time.
First, M constructs G= {d |M |= c(d)}, the set of defaults whose consequents are
consistent with the given model M. Due to Observation 13, we know that for normal
default theories there is only one possible set of generating defaults in G. This set
G1⊆G can be constructed in polynomial time: M uses an arbitrary ordering of the
defaults in G, call this tuple H .
M then scans the Erst default: if p(d1) is applicable, it adds the default to G1 and
deletes it from H . If not, nothing happens. Then M scans the next default with the
same procedure. If H is not empty after the Erst run of the algorithm, the algorithm is
called again starting with the new Erst default in H . The procedure stops if H is empty
or if the algorithm was already called n times. After n runs (n6m; where n is the
number of defaults in G), G1 has been created (all remaining defaults in H have not
applicable prerequisites). This algorithm is polynomial—it is called at most n times,
and each time tests at most n defaults if W ∧ c(G1) |=p(d) is polynomial for EHNF
default theories; the check is split to O(m2) tautology checks for dual Horn theories,
namely if taut(¬Wk ∨¬c(G1)∨p(d)). Checking if a dual Horn theory is a tautology
is O(m2). There are at most n2 uses of the algorithm (n6m), hence this step can be
decided after O(m6) steps where a conjunction of literals infers (is a superset of) a
conjunction of literals.
G1 is the generating set of 〈G;W 〉. To show that the extension W ∧ c(G1) is an
extension of 〈D;W 〉, M Enally needs to test if no default of D\G is applicable, i.e. for
all defaults d =∈G1 M shows that W ∧ c(G1) |=p(d) or W ∧ c(G)∧ c(d) is inconsistent
which is implemented in the loop for each d∈B of Fig. 4 (since we consider normal
default theories, each j(d) has only one element which is a Horntheory) and is in P,
too.
If yes, then M is a model of 〈D;W 〉, if no, then M is a not a model of 〈D;W 〉.
In Fig. 5, a deterministic algorithm, which checks in polynomial time ifM |= 〈D;W 〉
of a normal default theory, is represented (the not explicitly mentioned procedures
taut(dualHorntheory)? and sat(Horntheory)? are feasible in polynomial time, too.).
Lemma 27. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 an EHNF normal default theory.
Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is P-hard, even if 〈D;W 〉 is either disjunction free or
prerequisite free.
Proof. We Erst show hardness in the case of disjunction-free default theories: We use
a reduction of the P-complete problem of reasoning in propositional not-free logic
programming [4], i.e. given an atom g and a logic program P, if g is in the stable
model of P.
The Stable Model Semantics is one of the most important semantics for logic pro-
grams. For more details we refer to [5]. Recall that a disjunction-free not-free logic
program P can be viewed as a collection of Horn clauses. Therefore, it admits a
single stable model, which is the minimal model of the conjunction of these Horn
clauses.
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Input: An interpretation M, a disj.-free normal default theory 〈D;W 〉.
Result: “Accept” if M |= 〈D;W 〉; “Reject” otherwise.
begin
G := {d |M |= c(d)}; G1 := ∅; n := |G|; B=D\G;
disw := no: of disj: of Horn theories in W ; i := 0;
while i6n do
begin
i := i + 1;
for each d∈G do % in arbitrary order
begin
disp := no: of conj: of dual Horn theories in p(d); x := 0;
for k := 1 to disw
begin
for l := 1 to disp
begin
if taut(¬Wk ∨¬c(G1)∨pl(d)) then x := x + 1;
end;
end;
if x= disw · disp then G1 :=G1 ∪{d} and G :=G\{d};
end;
end;
for each d∈B do
begin
disp := no: of conj: of dual Horn theories in p(d); x := 0; y := 0;
for k := 1 to disw
begin
for l := 1 to disp
begin
if taut(¬Wk ∨¬c(G1)∨pl(d)) then x := x + 1;
end;
if sat(Wk ∧ c(G1)∧ j(d)) then y := 1;
end;
if x= disw · disp and y=1 then reject and halt;
end;
accept;
end.
Fig. 5. Deterministic algorithm of Lemma 26.
Let 〈D;W 〉 be the default theory where each clause b← a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an (with each
ai and b representing positive literals of the language including the atom g) of P
is translated into a normal default (a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an : b)=b and the default : ¬g=¬g is
added.
Then the model M containing all atoms of the language is a model of the default
theory iM there exists an extension without ¬g (in all other defaults only positive literals
occur) iM g can be inferred of the other defaults iM g is in the stable model of P.
The translation can be done in logarithmic space (the defaults are the program clauses
and just a Exed number of defaults (one) is added), hence this problem is P-hard.
In the case of prerequisite-free EHNF default theories we use a reduction of the
P-complete problem if a Horn theory is satisEable [20] (which is essentially the same
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if a logic program is satisEable, because the program clauses are Horn clauses) and
use the simple default theory 〈∅; W 〉 with W being a Horn theory.
Theorem 28. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 an EHNF normal default the-
ory. Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is P-complete, even if 〈D;W 〉 is either disjunction
free or prerequisite free.
If a normal default theory is disjunction free and prerequisite free, the problem no
longer remains P-hard and can easily be seen to be in logarithmic space:
Theorem 29. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a disjunction-free normal pre-
requisite-free default theory. Deciding whether M |= 〈D;W 〉 is in L.
Proof. Given an interpretation M and a default theory, Erst check which defaults are
good in the sense of Theorem 15 and form the set G—these are simple subset-checks.
Form the conjunction of all good consequents, which is a conjunction of literals.
Then check for each bad default if it is not consistent with this literal conjunction.
Hence,M is not a model of the default theory exactly if (g∧ b1)∨ (g∧ b2)∨ · · · ∨ (g∧
bm) is satisEable—where g is the conjunction of all literals of the good defaults, and
bj are conjunctions of literals of each consequent of bad defaults.
Hence, model checking for such default logics is the converse problem of SAT for
DNF (some additional subset-checks at the beginning occur; these can be carried out
in parallel time). Therefore this problem is in L, too.
Let us intuitively explain the results of this section, the previous section and the
results in [15]: For general default theories, model checking has two sources of hard-
ness. On the one hand, we cannot construct a set of generating defaults w.r.t. a given
model in polynomial time: We can construct a set G⊆D of defaults with M |= c(d)
for each d∈G—however, in general, there are 2|G| subsets, which are possible sets of
generating defaults (one default may block another one) and we need to consider all
of these. On the other hand, the other source of intractability w.r.t. a guessed set of
generating defaults is the hardness of the classical inference problem (which is used
for checks of consistency and if prerequisites can be derived).
In the case of normal default theories there is, due to Observation 13, w.r.t. one Exed
model only one set G1⊆G which is maybe a set of generating defaults. Therefore, the
initial guessing stage can be eliminated and G1 can be constructed in polynomial time
and the problem is hence in P2 (and as shown in Theorem 15, 
P
2 [O(log n)]-complete).
In the case of prerequisite-free normal default theories, just one oracle call remains and
the problem is in coNP.
If we restrict the defaults in a way that satisEability and inference is polynomial, the
other source of intractability is aMected: If all inference problems are in P the problem
is, due to the initial guessing stage, in NP. If such a default theory is restricted to
normal defaults, model checking complexity is polynomial, because the initial guessing
stage can be eliminated, too.
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Another interesting issue is the complexity of brave and cautious reasoning using
EHNF default theories. When we speak of syntactically restricted theories, this also
includes the target formula f to be restricted. In the case of disjunction-free default
theories, f was a conjunction of literals, in the case of EHNF default theories f
is a conjunction of dual Horn theories (then the Enal check is if E |=f is polyno-
mial). Reasoning with EHNF default theories is in almost all of the cases of the same
complexity as reasoning with disjunction-free default theories, i.e. for brave reasoning
NP-complete. The only diMerence is that brave reasoning is still NP-complete in the
case of normal prerequisite-free EHNF default theories. This is diMerent to the lower
polynomial complexity of brave reasoning with disjunction-free prerequisite-free nor-
mal default theories (at the beginning of this section we discussed that brave reasoning
in such theories gets NP-complete even if W is allowed to be a Horn theory and
all defaults remain disjunction free). In contrary, with respect to model checking of
normal prerequisite-free default theories, both EHNF default theories and disjunction-
free default theories are polynomial (however, in this restriction the latter case is not
P-hard) due to the possible constructive process with a particular given model in the
case of normal theories.
Model checking is one level easier than reasoning for normal default theories, hence
a polynomial algorithm for model checking for normal EHNF default theories was
derived. The class of EHNF default theories is a large class of default theories where
model checking remains polynomial (in the case of normal default theories) and hence
this tractability result seems very useful for practical applications.
6. Complexity of model checking for default theories with weak extensions
Let 〈D;W 〉 be a default theory and H be a subset of D. If
H = {d |d ∈ D;W ∧ c(H) |= p(d);
W ∧ c(H) |= ¬i ∀i ∈ j(d)}
then E= cons(W ∪ c(H)) is called a weak extension [18] of a default theory 〈D;W 〉.
H is called the set of generating defaults of 〈D;W 〉 w.r.t. E, also abbreviated as
GD(D; E).
We call M a weak model of 〈D;W 〉 iM M is a model of at least one (consistent)
weak extension. Due to the well-known fact that every extension is a weak extension,
too, it easily follows that every model of 〈D;W 〉 is a weak model of 〈D;W 〉. However,
the converse does not hold—it would hold, if an extension exists as subset of each weak
extension. However, this is in general not the case; consider the following example:
W = ∅; D =
{
a : b
b
;
b : a
a
;
: ¬a
¬a
}
:
This default theory admits the weak extension cons{a; b} which is, however, no exten-
sion and has no subset which forms one. Therefore, the interpretation {a; b} is only a
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weak model, but not a model of this default theory. Hence, the hardness and member-
ship results for model checking for normal default theories cannot be directly applied
for weak model checking, but have to be modiEed and yield the interesting result that
weak model checking does not turn easier with normal default theories.
6.1. General case
Theorem 30. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a default theory. Then, the
problem whether M is a weak model of 〈D;W 〉 is P2 -complete, even if 〈D;W 〉 is
semi-normal and prerequisite-free.
Proof. The hardness result follows immediately of the proof of Theorem 2 in [15],
where P2 -hardness of model checking with extensions is shown using a prerequisite-
free default theory, and the fact that in prerequisite-free default theories extensions
coincide with weak extensions.
Membership can be shown by initially guessing a set G⊆D: Then it is tested whether
G ≡ {d |d ∈ D;W ∧ c(G) |= p(d);
W ∧ c(G) |= ¬i ∀i ∈ j(d)}
which can be done in polynomial time with access to an oracle in NP for the sat-
isEability and inference checks. If the equation is true, then E= cons(W ∧ c(G)) is a
weak extension. Finally, it is tested in polynomial time if M |=W ∧ c(G). Therefore
the problem is in NPNP.
6.2. Normal default theories
One might ask, if the membership proof of Theorem 15 for model checking for nor-
mal default theories can in a similar way be applied to weak model checking: However,
this is not the case, because Observation 13 does not hold for weak extensions. But
there is, corresponding to the extension of 〈G;W 〉, at least a unique largest generating
set and a unique smallest generating set of the jointly compatible defaults of G.
Consider the following default theory 〈D;W 〉 with
W = ∅; D =
{
a : b
b
;
b : a
a
;
c : d
d
;
d : c
c
;
c : ¬e
¬e ;
: ¬b
¬b
}
and the model {a; b; d; c; e}. The Erst four defaults form the set G and the smallest
weak generating set w.r.t. G is the empty set, the largest is the set {a; b; c; d}. However,
in both cases one of the bad defaults Eres and ¬b or ¬e can be inferred, respectively.
Nevertheless, M is a model of this default theory, namely of the extension cons{a; b}.
Therefore, it is neither suScient consider the smallest generating set of G nor the
largest, and the problem of Step 2 turns into a procedure where an exponential number
of diMerent sets deserve to be considered.
Even if it would be suScient to consider the largest weak generating set (then
Steps 3 and 4 of the proof of Theorem 15 could be left unchanged) there is no
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polynomial algorithm with calling an NP-oracle only logarithmically often comput-
ing the cardinality of this largest set G1: The problem if |G1|¿r is equivalent to
∃G′1 ∀d∈G′1 :W ∧ c(G′1) |=p(d). Recall the discussion in the Erst claim of Theorem 15,
where we showed the importance of “ |=” together with the existential quantiEer. If we
try to guess interpretations in a data-structure together with a set G′1, the problem
looks like ∃G′1∀I : : :⇒ : : : and, due to the quantiEer alternation, simply guessing a
data-structure this way is not possible.
Moreover, we will show that the problem is even P2 -hard as all possible weak
generating sets have to be considered.
The non-constructive nature of weak extensions allows an easier characterisation
of weak extensions than with the iterative characterisation of extensions; however, the
constructive nature of extensions allows an easier approach to algorithms as the diMerent
complexity results in the case of normal default theories with prerequisites shows.
Observe that the P2 -completeness of model checking for normal default theories with
weak extensions does not follow from the fact that brave reasoning is P2 -complete in
the case of normal default theories (with standard or weak extensions). Model checking
is a diMerent problem of which one in general can only say that it is not harder than
brave reasoning. As we have seen in Theorem 15, model checking can turn easier
because it is based on extension Ending. However, for model checking with weak
extensions this is not the case:
Theorem 31. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a normal default theory. Then
the problem to decide whether M is a weak model of 〈D;W 〉 is P2 -complete.
Proof. Only hardness remains to be shown as membership has been shown in the
previous subsection for arbitrary default theories. We use a reduction from the P2 -
complete problem QBF2;∃, this is the problem if there exists an evaluation of the
pi ∈P such that for each evaluation of the qj ∈Q; F(P;Q) is true (abbreviated as:
∃P∀QF(P;Q) with second order quantiEcation).
Let 〈D;W 〉 be W = ∅,
D =
⋃
i
{
w ⇒ pi : w ⇒ pi
w ⇒ pi ;
w ⇒ ¬pi : w ⇒ ¬pi
w ⇒ ¬pi
}
∪
{¬w : v
v
;
: w∧¬F
w ∧ ¬F
}
;
with w and v being new propositional atoms.
This transformation is feasible in polynomial time. We show that M= ∅ is a model
of 〈D;W 〉 iM ∃P∀QF(P;Q).
• ∃P∀QF(P;Q) implies that there is a valuation of the pi which makes F true for
all evaluations of the qj. Due to the non-constructive nature of weak extensions we
are allowed to choose which of the Erst two defaults for each i Ere—we can choose
that none, one or both of them Ere, as their consequents allow to derive their own
prerequisites. In the required extension exactly one consequent for each i shall be
in the context, namely the one corresponding to the truth evaluation. Then the last
default cannot be applied, as assuming w∧¬F is inconsistent (¬(w∧¬F)≡w⇒F
can be inferred of a context containing for each i either w⇒pi or w⇒¬pi exactly
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if w⇒F can be inferred and hence, exactly if F is valid under a valuation of the
pi), and the default yielding v cannot be used either, hence ∅ is a model.
• Assume, ∅ |= 〈D;W 〉. Then the last two defaults should not be used. W.r.t. extensions
the Enal default would always be used as it is the only prerequisite-free default.
However, w.r.t. weak extensions a suitable combination of the other defaults may
forbid to use it. Of the Erst defaults for each i one, two or no default can Ere. The
case that for some i no default Eres is not interesting, as the Enal default then can
be used (unless for all undeEned i an evaluation of the the pi exists that F is valid
for all evaluations of the not Exed pi, however, then also the weaker result holds
that an evaluation exists). If more than one default for some i is used, then ¬w can
be inferred, but the default yielding v needs to be used, and hence ∅ would not be
a model. Therefore, use exactly one default for each i. So, we need a context like
this:
⋃
i
{(w ⇒ pi) |pi ∈ P} ∪
⋃
i
{(w ⇒ ¬pi) | ¬pi ∈ P}
with P is an evaluation making F valid (i.e. true for each evaluation of the qj). This
context allows to use the defaults yielding w⇒¬pi or w⇒pi, respectively. Only
this context disallows using the default yielding ¬F ∧w, since ¬F ∧w is inconsistent
(if w is assumed, then the pi and ¬pi are inferred due to the context and F is valid,
hence ¬F ∧w is inconsistent). Therefore, context and inferred formulae coincide, the
context forms a weak extension and M is a model of it (¬w is true in the model).
Hence, M= ∅ is a model of 〈D;W 〉 iM ∃P∀QF(P;Q).
Theorem 32. LetM be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a normal prerequisitefree default
theory. Then the problem to decide whether M is a weak model of 〈D;W 〉 is coNP-
complete.
Proof. Since the theory is prerequisite free, extensions coincide with weak extensions
and therefore the proof of Theorem 7 in [15] for model checking w.r.t. extensions can
be used.
6.3. EHNF default theories
Theorem 33. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 an EHNF default theory. Then,
the problem to decide whether M is a weak model of 〈D;W 〉 is NP-complete even if
the theory is disjunction free and either semi-normal and prerequisite free or normal.
Proof. The membership proof for arbitrary disjunction-free default theories is essen-
tially the same as the membership proof in Theorem 30 without access to an oracle in
NP for satisEability and inference checks, and hence this problem is in NP (the sat-
isEability and inference checks are tractable in an analogous way to the corresponding
proofs of Section 5, only a Exed G is used instead of iterations of Gi for inference
checks).
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For semi-normal, prerequisite-free default theories the hardness proof is exactly the
same as in Lemma 24; to show hardness for normal default theories (with prerequisites)
we have to modify the corresponding proof to achieve normalisation using the power
of weak extensions.
We use a reduction from 3SAT: Let F(t1; : : : ; tm) be a formula in conjunctive normal
form with exactly three literals per clause:
F = F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fi ∧ · · · ∧ Fn
with Fi = xi1 ∨ xi2 ∨ xi3 (the xij are literals, and the tk are propositional atoms). Deciding
if F is satisEable is NP-complete.
Let 〈D;W 〉 be W = ∅ and
D=
⋃
k
{¬uk : ¬uk
¬uk ;
¬tk : ¬tk
¬tk ;
¬uk ∧¬tk : z
z
}
∪⋃
i
{
f(xi1) : ¬yi
¬yi ;
f(xi2) : ¬yi
¬yi ;
f(xi3) : ¬yi
¬yi ;
: yi
yi
}
with f(xij)=¬tk if xij =¬tk and f(xij)=¬uk if xij = tk .
We prove that F is satisEable iM M= ∅ is a model of 〈D;W 〉.
Due to the “self-referential” power of weak extensions we achieve that a context
may include for each k ¬uk and ¬tk or just one of these, or even none. However, if
both are, for some k part of the context, then it is forced that v is inferred, and hence
∅ is not a model.
If a context is chosen which for some k neither includes ¬tk nor ¬uk , then some
of the required prerequisites f(xij) cannot be used. Hence, all we can achieve with
such a context to prohibit that a default yielding a positive yi needs to be used, can be
achieved with a context, where for each k exactly one of ¬uk or ¬tk is in the context,
too.
Hence, choose a context with for each k either ¬tk or ¬uk (and including all ¬yi):
F is satisEable iM this evaluation of F is chosen in the context, which makes all
¬yi inferrable, and therefore only negated literals are in this extension; and if F is
not satisEable it is necessary to include some yi as in the corresponding proof for
extensions. So it can be concluded that ∅ |= 〈D;W 〉 iM F is satisEable.
Theorem 34. Let M be an interpretation and 〈D;W 〉 a prerequisite-free normal
EHNF default theory. Then the problem to decide whether M is a weak model
of 〈D;W 〉 is P-complete.
Proof. This proof follows immediately of Lemmas 26 and 27 and the fact that in
prerequisite-free default theories weak extensions and extensions coincide.
Moreover, if a default theory is prerequisite free, normal, and disjunction free, then
model checking with weak extensions is, as model checking with standard extensions,
in L.
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7. Complexity of model checking with AEL and N
We do not describe autoepistemic logic (AEL) and non-monotonic logic N in detail
here, the reader is referred to [16,8] for further deEnitions and complexity results w.r.t.
reasoning in AEL and N.
Formally, = {	 |T ∪K∪¬K V |= 	} where T is a set of modal premises, K=
{K | ∈} and ¬K V= {¬K |  =∈} [17]. A  fulElling this equation is a stable
expansion of AEL.
Informally, expansions of AEL are constructed due to some kind of non-monotonic
positive and negative introspection. In [19] an equivalent Enitary characterisation of
stable expansions useful for complexity considerations is given.
In non-monotonic modal logic N non-monotonic introspection is just limited to neg-
ative introspection; however, in the corresponding Exed-point equation reasoning with
additionally using the necessitation rule is allowed.
M is a propositional AEL-model of a set of premises in Lm (the propositional
language extended with the modal operator L) iM M satisEes an objective part of at
least one stable expansion.
M is a propositional N-model of a set of premises in Lm iMM satisEes an objective
part of at least one N-expansion.
It is well known that the weak extensions of a default theory correspond to objec-
tive (i.e. propositional without the modal operator) parts of the stable extensions of
a polynomial translation of this default theory into an autoepistemic theory. Addition-
ally, it is known that extensions of a default theory correspond to objective parts of
N-expansions in the same way [18]. Hence, from the results of the previous sections
we immediately obtain the following corollaries:
Corollary 35. Let  be a set of premises in Lm and M an interpretation. Deciding
if M is a propositional AEL-model is P2 -hard.
Corollary 36. Let  be a set of premises in Lm and M an interpretation. Deciding
if M is a propositional N-model is P2 -hard.
To prove membership we use the results of Gottlob [8] w.r.t. reasoning.
Lemma 37. Let  be a set of premises in Lm and M an interpretation. Deciding if
M is a propositional AEL=N-model is in P2 .
Proof. In [8] it is shown that the problem if a formula is not occurring in all ex-
pansions (the converse problem of cautious reasoning) is in P2 (using the Enitary
characterisation of NiemelWa [19] with modal subformulae). Consider the propositional
language {a1; : : : ; an} and any model M containing some of these atoms. Then M |=E
iM E |=L1∨· · ·∨Ln with Li =¬ai if ai ∈M and Li = ai if ai =∈M. Therefore, the model
checking problem is a special instance of this problem. The proof is analogous for the
case of N-expansions.
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Hence, both, propositional model checking with autoepistemic logic and with non-
monotonic logic N is P2 -complete.
8. Translation of default logic into disjunctive logic programming
First, we would like to sketch some known results concerning the comparison of the
expressive power of default logic and disjunctive logic programming and discuss some
negative results arising from complexity results of [15] and this paper. In the spirit of
[10,13] we deEne:
Denition 38. A pfm-function f :A →B is a function translating a non-monotonic for-
malism A into a non-monotonic formalism B fulElling the following additional criteria:
Polynomiality: the time required to translate a theory in A into a theory in B is poly-
nomial; Modularity: a propositional subtheory can independently be translated; and
Faithfulness: the extensions=expansions of the theory and the translated theory coin-
cide w.r.t. the propositional sublanguage.
In [13] a weaker concept of faithfulness is proposed instead which ignores inconsis-
tent extensions and gives the possibility to introduce new variables. In [10] for instance,
a non-modular translation function from default logic into autoepistemic logic is given.
Denition 39. The non-monotonic formalism B is at least as expressive as A if a
pfm-function f exists which maps all theories of A into theories of formalism B.
To learn more about the disjunctive logic programming formalism (DLP) and its
semantics, the reader is referred to [5]: In DLP with the stable models semantics
cautious reasoning is +P2 -complete and brave reasoning 
P
2 -complete, like in default
logic, which gives hope for a translation function which fulElls the above criteria.
However, the high complexity of inference in DLP has diMerent reasons; reasoning is
deEned via models and model checking is an easier task than in default logic. Model
checking in DLP is coNP-complete for several semantics such as the stable models
semantics.
In literature, polynomial, modular and faithful translations from logic programming
with stable semantics into default logic have already been explored [6,12] in the sense
that stable models are identiEed with default logic extensions.
These translation functions show that default logic (and disjunctive default logic; see
Section 9) is at least as expressive as logic programming. However, one may ask if
there is any chance to establish a pfm-function into the opposite direction.
It is easy to see that default logic is more expressive than disjunctive logic pro-
gramming, since the default theory {: x=x; :¬x=¬x} returns two extensions cons{x} and
cons{¬x}. However, no disjunctive program with the stable semantics can admit the
models {x} and ∅, since every stable model is a minimal model, too; at least this prob-
lem could be solved with introducing a new variable x′ to represent ¬x in a disjunctive
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Fig. 6. Model checking in default logic and disjunctive logic programming.
program, however other problems remain (introducing new variables is similar to using
extended disjunctive logic programs instead of DLPs)—in default logic, extensions do
not have to be total, but models of DLP are total; this can be solved with answer sets
of extended disjunctive logic programs, short EDLPs, see e.g. [5]); however, in default
logic, an extension can be of the form {a∨ b} and we cannot End a corresponding
answer set of extended logic programming (and would need to compare more than one
answer set with one extension).
Instead of directly comparing the complexity of model checking in DLP with the
corresponding task of extension checking (the corresponding task in a faithful trans-
lation is not model checking, since models of DLP are treated as extensions), the
model checking results of this paper and of [15] immediately clarify the matter of a
pfm-translation from disjunctive logic programming into the default logic formalism.
Theorem 40. Unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, there exists no pfm-function
mapping default logic, normal default logic or disjunction-free default logic into dis-
junctive logic programming.
Before giving a proof, let us consider the diagram of Fig. 6. If there were a pfm-
function mapping a default theory 〈D;W 〉 to a disjunctive logic program P and vice
versa (as indicated by the respective arcs), then M |= 〈D;W 〉 iM M |=P. However,
this would require that the model checking problem resides at the same level for both
formalisms.
Proof. Assume the existence of a pfm-function embedding default logic into disjunc-
tive logic programming. Due to known results of pfm-functions translating disjunctive
logic programming into default logic, both formalism would be equally expressive and
hence admit the same models (extensions in logic programming are deEned via
models).
However, as model checking with logic programming formalism is only coNP-
complete, this would imply that P2 = coNP, i.e. that the polynomial hierarchy col-
lapses. Even in the case of normal default theories, this is not possible, as model
checking for normal default theories is P2 [O(log n)]-complete, and would imply that
P2 [O(log n)]= coNP. Restricting default theories to conjunctions of literals and
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assuming that a pfm-function exists from disjunction-free default logic into disjunctive
logic programming would imply that NP= coNP.
The complexity results of model checking for default logic only leave it possible
that prerequisite free, normal default theories can be translated with a pfm-function into
the disjunctive logic programming formalism. However, it remains highly uncertain if
such a translation would be strongly modular, i.e. allowing to translate each default
rule independently into one or more logic program clauses and faithful in the sense of
[10].
9. Disjunctive default logic and stationary default logic
In [2], we closely analyse the complexity of model checking for disjunctive default
logic and stationary default logic. Here we just include the main results, preceded by
some deEnitions.
A disjunctive default [6] is an expression of the form
	 : 1; : : : ; m
.1| : : : |.n :
The .i are called the consequent. Here, let c(G) be the set of all consequent of all
defaults d∈G. The operator “|” is called e7ective disjunction.
A disjunctive rule is a rule of the form 	=(.1| : : : |.n). A Enite theory E is closed
under a disjunctive rule if, whenever E |= 	, then there exist i, 16i6n with E |= .i.
It is suScient to use the condition .i ∈E instead of E |= .i, since we only use base
theories E (which are a set of consequents plus W ).
Let D be a disjunctive default theory (ddt) and let E=W ∪H with H ⊆ c(D). The
reduct of D with respect to E, denoted by DE is the set of inference rules deEned as
follows: If the default
	 : 1; : : : ; m
.1| : : : |.n
is in D and E |=¬i for all 1; : : : ; m, then 	.1|:::|.n is in DE .
A Enite set of formulae E is the base of an extension for a ddt D if E is a minimal
set (w.r.t. the subset-relation) closed under the rules of the reduct DE . Every extension
is of the form cons(E) (and hence is also propositionally closed). Here, in contrary to
the previous sections, we characterise extensions using a Enite extension base instead
of a set of generating defaults, because the actual set of consequents is required rather
than the set of generating defaults only (which would leave the question open which
of their consequents Ere). Due to a diMerent characterisation of extensions here, one
does not need to compare sets of defaults as with the quasi-inductive characterisation
above.
〈D;W 〉 is a (semi)normal limited disjunctive default theory iM only W contains eM-
ective disjunctions (i.e. default rules with eMective disjunctions but with no prerequisites
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and true justiEcations, which we treat as if they were in W ) and each default in D is
a standard (semi)normal default rule without eMective disjunctions.
Instead of this limited concept, one could introduce special normal disjunctive rules:
〈D;W 〉 is a normal default theory iM each default is of the form
	 : .1 ∨ · · · ∨ .n
.1| : : : |.n
and W contains no eMective disjunction; and in a similar fashion for semi-normal
default theories.
EHNF and disjunction-free disjunctive default theories are deEned in an analogous
way as for standard default logic. Observe that in disjunction-free normal disjunctive
default theories, disjunctions are allowed in the justiEcations to express a normal default
but nowhere else.
Moreover, in [2] we generalise the concept of weak extensions to disjunctive default
theories in a way which is advantageous for complexity issues. The base of a weak
extension is a Enite set of formulae E⊆W ∪ c(D) which is
• Closed under the rules of DE .
• Inverse closed: i.e. for each rule 	.1|:::|.n of DE , if exists a .i ∈E, then E |= 	.
• Each c(d) occurring in E must appear as a consequent of at least one rule of DE
where E |= 	 (i.e., there is no unfounded knowledge).
In [2], we show that the above deEnition matches the usual characterisation of weak
extensions if restricted to standard (= non-disjunctive) default theories. In [2], we de-
rive the exact complexity classiEcations for standard and weak model checking for
disjunctive default logic and a large number of restrictions (such as limited normal
theories in extended Horn normal form).
We show that even model checking for disjunctive default theories containing only
conjunctions of laterals is P2 -complete (the same is true of reasoning in this case, due
to the fact that reasoning with the special case of extended disjunctive logic programs
is in P2 ). However, we give favourable results in case of limited disjunctive default
theories by proving NP-completeness for such restrictions.
The generalisation of the concept of weak extensions to disjunctive theories
in a way which is advantageous for complexity issues allows for NP-completeness for
not limited disjunction-free disjunctive default theories and even allows for tracta-
bility in case of normal and prerequisite-free theories in extended Horn normal
form.
In [2] we also consider stationary default logic, which uses a diMerent concept to
compute extensions allowing the existence of a smallest extension which is contained
in all extensions (however, this extension is simply the consequence of W in case two
extensions have contradicting consequences). It is known that cautious reasoning is
easier in this setting, whereas brave reasoning remains as hard as usual. The fact that
a smallest extension exists makes model checking easier since an interpretation only
needs to be a model of the smallest extension.
The results of this section are compiled in Tables 3–7.
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10. Conclusion and future work
A summary of our results concerning model checking for default logic for standard
default logic is presented in Table 1, together with the results in [15] (which are marked
with “•”). In Table 2 the results concerning weak model checking are presented.
To show that model checking for normal default theories is in P2 [O(log n)] we
improved techniques for guessing data-structures Gottlob used in [9] (about stationary
default logic): Some steps in the main proof of that section consisted of guessing a
whole structure, including, for instance, some interpretations; this allowed us to use the
model relation instead of the inference relation and hence to “move the hardness of
classical propositional inference into the previous guessing of a structure”. The other
main tool we used was binary search, a very useful means to obtain a logarithmic
number of calls to an oracle.
Probably this result and the achieved results for other presented default logics can in
a similar way be generalised to other variants of default reasoning considered in [15].
The class of normal default theories in extended Horn normal form is an ample
class admitting a polynomial algorithm for model checking and hence is of enormous
interest for practical applications.
Weak model checking has been shown to coincide w.r.t. complexity with model
checking for all considered cases except for normal default theories with prerequisites;
the non-constructive nature of weak extensions forbids an easier procedure for model
checking. This result is also connected to the fact that no modular translation from
default logic into autoepistemic logic exists [10], as the prerequisites are treated in a
very diMerent way.
We used our results to show that model checking in autoepistemic logic (resp. logic
N) is P2 -complete, since the objective parts of stable expansions (resp. N-expansions)
correspond to weak extensions (resp. extensions) in default logic.
Table 1
Complexity of model checking for default theories
General Semi-normal Normal
General P2 -complete • P2 -complete • P2 [O(log n)]-cmpl.
Prerequisite free P2 -complete • P2 -complete • coNP-complete •
Df-EHNF NP-complete NP-complete P-complete
Df-EHNF=prer. free NP-complete NP-complete P-complete (Df: L)
Table 2
Complexity of weak model checking for default theories
General Semi-normal Normal
General P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Prerequisite free P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete coNP-complete
Df-EHNF NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Df-EHNF=prer. free NP-complete NP-complete P-complete (Df: L)
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Table 3
Complexity of model checking for disjunctive default theories
General Semi-normal Normal
General P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Prerequisite free P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Df-EHNF P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Df-EHNF=prer. free NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Table 4
Complexity of model checking for limited disjunctive default theories
General Semi-normal Normal
General P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Prerequisite free P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Df-EHNF NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Df-EHNF=prer. free NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Our results are also useful for further comparisons of default logic with other non-
monotonic formalisms (as indicated in Section 4).
The collection of Tables 3–6 present the results we derived for complexity of model
checking for disjunctive default logic. We showed that even model checking with
disjunction free and EHNF ddt’s is P2 -complete; however, if furthermore prerequisite
free, the complexity decreases one level and turns the problems into NP-complete
ones—this result is still valid if every consequent and all justiEcations are limited to
single laterals, and hence equally valid for model checking in EDLPs (not answer set
checking 4); see also Section 8. Using limited ddt’s, the complexity of model checking
in case of disjunction-free and EHNF ddt’s turns out to be only as hard as for standard
default logic for almost all considered cases due to creating an independence of two
intermingled sources of complexity. However, two cases remain harder, namely the case
of prerequisite-free and normal ddt’s, since the complexity introduced with eMective
disjunctions remains.
In the disjunctive default logic setting the complexity of weak model checking turns
out to be the favourable one w.r.t. complexity, at least in the way we generalised it.
The diMerence between limited and not limited theories vanishes, because one source
of complexity disappears. This allows also for an easier complexity in case of normal
prerequisite-free theories, for whom model checking is even polynomial if disjunction
free or EHNF. The results of weak model checking for ddt’s hence are the same as
for weak model checking with standard default theories.
4 Answer sets are incomplete models used in the semantics of extended disjunctive logic programming;
model checking in this case asks if a given propositional interpretation satisEes at least one answer set of a
given theory.
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Table 5
Complexity of weak model checking for disjunctive default theories
General Semi-normal Normal
General P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Prerequisite free P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete coNP-complete
Df-EHNF NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Df-EHNF=prer. free NP-complete NP-complete P-complete
Table 6
Complexity of weak model checking for limited disjunctive default theories
General Semi-normal Normal
General P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Prerequisite free P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete coNP-complete
Df-EHNF NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Df-EHNF=prer. free NP-complete NP-complete P-complete
Table 7
Complexity of stationary model checking for default theories
General Semi-normal Normal
General P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete 
P
2 [O(log n)]-complete
Prerequisite free P2 -complete 
P
2 -complete coNP-complete
Df-EHNF P-complete P-complete P-complete
Df-EHNF=prer. free P-complete P-complete P-complete
Table 7 summarises the results for stationary default logic. Although model checking
is somehow related to brave reasoning, because an interpretation needs to be a model
of at least one extension, the fact that a smallest extension exists, of course, allows an
easier model checking algorithm.
Further work includes investigation of the complexity of model checking for other
widely used variants of default reasoning, and most important for practical applica-
tions, to isolate and enlarge further tractable classes by imposing only minor restric-
tions on the defaults. Moreover, our results allow to draw various new parallels with
other knowledge representation formalisms (like already proposed and discussed in
Section 8).
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